








Protest voting in the laboratory 
 




The Department of Economics 
Lancaster University Management School 











All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, 
provided that full acknowledgement is given. 
 
 
LUMS home page: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/lums/ 
Protest voting in the laboratory




Formal analysis predicts that the likelihood of an electoral accident depends on
the preference intensity for a successful protest, but not on the protest’s popularity:
an increase in protest’s popularity is fully offset by a reduction in the individual
probability of casting a protest vote. By conducting the first laboratory experiment
on protest voting, we find strong evidence in favor of the first prediction and qual-
ified support for the latter. While the offset effect is present, it is not as strong as
the theory predicts: protest candidates gain both by fanaticising existing protesters
and by expanding the protest’s popular base.
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“‘To be quite frank, I did not believe [Brexit] would happen,’ [the interviewee says], ‘I
thought I’d put in a protest vote.’ [...] As soon as [she] saw the result the following
morning, her heart sank. ‘I was in shock,’ she remembers.” (Lynskey 2017)
Protest voting has been on the rise in recent years and takes different forms (Alvarez
et al. 2018). It is often fuelled by populism and may result to radical policy changes. The
vote on Brexit, the Trump era in the US, or the rise of extreme and anti-establishment par-
ties across Western democracies are just prominent examples. Research however remains
premature and social scientists still try to understand both its causes and consequences.
In this paper, we follow Myatt (2017) and Kselman and Niou (2011) thinking of protest
voting as a strategic action signalling voters’ disaffection towards their otherwise preferred
candidate or party. We then explore via a theory-driven laboratory investigation how the
protest’s popularity and salience may affect voters’ behaviour and the probability of an
electoral accident (i.e. an undesired –by the majority– electoral outcome).
As a motivating example, consider the 2016 Brexit referendum on whether the UK
should remain a member of the EU. Experts, academics, and (most) politicians argued
that remaining in the EU was a superior outcome than leaving. The initial polls, and,
probably, even David Cameron when calling the referendum, were indeed predicting a
victory of remain (Ipsos Mori 2016). These predictions were invalidated by the actual
vote that favoured the leave option by a narrow win. This was to many a surprise
as EU membership was not among the citizens’ major concerns. At the time, voters
definitely worried more about the national health service and the state of the economy
rather than EU membership (Ipsos Mori 2015). And given the narrow win to leave
the EU, one will never know whether a majority of the British electorate truly believed
that leaving the EU was the right outcome. Even post referendum polls indicate quite
the opposite. Most voters were still of the view that Brexit will deteriorate their living
standards (Ipsos Mori 2018). Indeed, support for the leave vote was concentrated among
left-behind voters, and leaving the EU is not in their economic interest (Sampson 2017).
So if Brexit was “accidental”, what may lie behind its success? Our results suggest that
the radical, nevertheless very successful, leave campaign orchestrated by Nigel Farage
and Boris Johnson may have played an important role. A successful campaign aiming
not only at expanding the pool of protesters, but also at fanaticising protest voters –who
thought that this would be victory for remain– may have given populist movements a
great story of success.1
1Obviously, this work does not aim to explain the Brexit referendum outcome. This referendum
serves as a relevant example. For academic work on Brexit see a recent survey by Sampson (2017) and
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Building on our example, we closely follow Myatt (2017) and consider a society that
has to decide between a “mainstream” and a “protest” alternative via simple majority
rule. Voters are of two types: “protesters” or “non-protesters”. In the simplest version
of such model, both types of voters agree that the mainstream alternative is preferred
over the protest one. But while non-protesters just rank the two alternatives, protesters’
most preferred outcome is a “successful protest”. A protest is viewed successful when
the mainstream alternative wins, but the margin of victory is below a certain threshold.
Same as for non-protesters, protesters’ least preferred outcome is a win by the protest
alternative. Why protest voters care about the margin of victory and prefer to see such
margin below a given threshold may be simply down to preferences of voters to avoid a
landslide win by the mainstream candidate. This motivation could fit our Brexit example.
Some protest voters may voted to leave, thinking that remain would win, and rather
wanted to engage in a protest vote avoiding a large winning margin for the remain side
and the “establishment”. In other instances, the winning margin may also determine the
winner’s power. For example, in some countries, constitutional reforms and important
law changes require a super majority in parliament, versus regular policy implementation
that can be typically executed with a simple majority.
In the above setting, formal analysis dictates that non-protesters always vote for the
mainstream alternative. Protesters instead randomize between voting for the mainstream
alternative and protesting and, hence, electoral accidents cannot be ruled out. As our
results show, the frequency of protest depends on: i) the protest’s popularity (i.e., the
expected share of protest voters), and ii) the protest’s salience (i.e., the extra utility
that protesters enjoy when the protest succeeds compared to a landslide win for the
mainstream alternative).
Consider first that the protest’s popularity is relatively low. A protester knows that
her vote for the protest alternative has very few chances to generate an electoral accident
where the mainstream alternative loses, and hence frequently protests. As the protest be-
comes more popular, the probability of such an accident naturally increases if protesters
do not adjust their protest probability. This incentivizes each protester to actually protest
less and less frequently as the popularity of protest increases, and, intriguingly, the proba-
bility of an electoral accident (i.e., a defeat of the mainstream candidate) in equilibrium is
not affected by the protests popularity: An increase in the expected share of protesters, is
fully offset by the decrease in the probability each individual protester chooses to protest.
The frequency of electoral accidents instead is found to depend crucially on the
protest’s salience. As protester types obtain a higher utility differential from a suc-
cessful protest, the individual frequency of protesting increases. This clearly affects the
references therein.
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frequency of different electoral outcomes. As the protest’s salience increases and individ-
uals protest more often, there is an increase in the frequency of electoral accidents and a
decrease in the frequency of failed protests.
But is this equilibrium analysis pertinent to settings of empirical interest? To give
a first answer, we take the above theoretical predictions to the laboratory and consider
the simplest possible experimental setup to test them: Two voters choose simultaneously
whether to vote for the mainstream or the protest alternative. If both subjects vote
for the mainstream alternative, the mainstream alternative wins and the protest fails.
If there is one vote for each alternative then the mainstream alternative wins and the
protest is successful. An electoral accident occurs when both subjects vote for the protest
alternative and therefore the mainstream alternative loses. In this setting, we use a 2x2
factorial design where we vary either the protest’s popularity or the protest’s salience, our
two main variables in the theoretical setting as far as comparative statics are concerned.
In line with the theory, fixing the protest’s popularity, an increase in the protest’s
salience increases the individual frequency of protest voting and hence the frequency of
electoral accidents and of successful protests. Fixing the protest’s salience instead, an
increase in the protest’s popularity decreases the individual frequency of protest voting.
Nevertheless, this offsetting effect of the protest’s popularity on the individual proba-
bility to protest is substantially smaller than predicted by the theory. Therefore, the
frequency of electoral accidents is also increasing in the protest’s popularity. This finding
was not predicted by the theoretical analysis and highlights the added value of the ex-
perimental investigation. Protest campaigns may gain not only by fanaticizing existing
protesters, but also by expanding their base. Finally, our laboratory exercise uncovers a
tendency for role-playing : subjects seem to coordinate in the long-run by gradually em-
ploying asymmetric strategies (i.e., some subjects over-protest and others under-protest).
This suggests that in frameworks of repeated interaction, the set of the protest-oriented
population that actually protests may end up pretty stable over time.2
Our contribution to the literature is twofold: First, we adjust the model of Myatt
(2017) in a way that permits us to highlight the differences between the protest’s salience
and popularity. Indeed, while our approach is a derivative of Myatt (2017) the two models
are not nested: Myatt (2017) considers richer environments regarding types of voters
and information (i.e. aggregate uncertainty), but he focuses on bell-shaped distributions,
which make it hard to disentangle the protest’s popularity and the protest’s salience. The
simplified version of the Myatt (2017) model that we employ (i.e. with only two types of
voters) allows us to do that and dictates a clean experimental design. More importantly,
2This is in line with other experimental studies of voting behaviour (e.g. Bouton et al. 2016) who
also find gradual convergence to asymmetric behaviour.
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we present experimental evidence supporting the above theoretical predictions. This is
important since a) empirical validation of the theory of strategic protesting is scarce and
indirect (e.g., Franklin et al. 1994; Blais 2004; Burden 2005; Kselman and Niou 2011;
Campante et al. 2018), and b) it seems impossible to empirically test the independent
effects of the protest’s popularity and salience on electoral outcomes as predicted by the
theory.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first experiment on protest voting. Never-
theless, the setting at hand links with previous theoretical work on political economy,
and hence subsequent laboratory experiments. First, protest voting bears some similari-
ties with classical models of strategic voting in multi-candidate elections. In these models
there is need for coordination among subjects belonging in the majority, to avoid an “elec-
toral accident” where the Condorcet loser wins the election (Palfrey 1989; Myerson and
Weber 1993; Fey 1997; Bouton and Castanheira 2012). Such models were subsequently
tested in the laboratory (Forsythe et al. 1993; Bouton et al. 2017). In contrast to these
models, protest voters do not have monotonic preferences over their favourite candidate’s
vote share. Second, our work links with theoretical models of costly voting and strate-
gic turnout (Krishna and Morgan 2012; Myatt 2015; Faravelli and Sanchez-Pages 2015)
and experimental evidence (Herrera et al. 2014; Kartal 2015; Palfrey and Pogorelskiy
2019; Herrera et al. 2019). In these models, voters want either their preferred alternative
to win (in private value settings), or the society to take the right decision (in common
value settings), but would rather save the cost of participating in the election. In our
model instead, there is no preference for abstention (i.e. when the protest succeeds, all
protesters –both those who voted the mainstream alternative and those who did not– en-
joy the same utility) and whether protesters decide to protest or vote for the mainstream
candidate depends solely on the expectation of the protest being successful. In a recent
paper, Ginzburg et al. (2019) develop and experimentally test a model in which voters
receive expressive utility from voting for an ethical alternative, although they prefer it
not to win. Although one could view protest as such an ethical alternative, there is an
important difference in the two setups. Voters receive utility from a successful protest
irrespective of whether they voted for the protest alternative themselves. Finally, there
is a series of papers that focuses on strategic voting combined with different types of
signalling from voters to candidates via the electoral outcome, but those do not feature
the coordination or anti-coordination features put forward in the previously mentioned
literature (Castanheira 2003; Shotts 2006; Razin 2003; Meirowitz and Shotts 2009).
In what follows we first derive our hypotheses by studying a simple formal model
of protest voting (Section 2), we then present our experimental design (Section 3) and
results (Section 4), and, finally, we conclude (Section 5).
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2 Theoretical arguments
Consider a society of n individuals, N = {1, 2, ..., n}, with n ≥ 2 and even, which has
to make a choice between two alternatives {M,P}, referred to as the mainstream and
the protest alternative, respectively. The decision is taken by a simple majority vote,
abstention is not allowed, and in case of a tie alternative M is chosen.3
Individuals are of two types: “protesters” or “non-protesters”. All individuals prefer
a win of alternative M to a win of alternative P , but “protesters” do not have monotonic
preferences over the number of votes for M , in the spirit of Myatt (2017).4 Formally, “non-
protesters” enjoy utility one when M wins and utility zero when P wins. “Protesters”
instead, enjoy utility 1 + s > 1 when M wins and the protest succeeds, utility one when
M wins and the protest fails, and utility zero when P wins. The protest succeeds if M




+ 1, ..., n − 1}.
Parameter s > 0 captures the protest’s salience. The above preferences for protesters are
summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Outcome and utility of the “protester” type.
The timing is as follows: At stage zero, nature draws the types of the individuals with
i.i.d. draws from a binomial distribution with parameter q ∈ (0, 1), which is common
information and represents the probability that a random individual is a “protester”.
Each individual observes her own type, but does not observe the type of her fellow
citizens. At stage one, players simultaneously decide whether to vote for M or P . At
stage two, the outcome of the election is announced and the payoffs of all players are
3The assumptions of an even number of voters instead of an odd number of voters, and whether M
or P win in case of a tie do not affect the qualitative features of our main result.
4Allowing for voters who prefer a win of alternative P does not add to the analysis of strategic voting
behaviour. For the sake of simplicity we therefore do not consider this possibility, though it could be
easily accommodated in our model.
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computed. Given that strategic decisions are made simultaneously only in the first stage
of the game, the natural solution approach is to seek for Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE).
We take the size of the society and the protest success threshold as given, and we focus
on the comparative effects of the protest’s popularity, q, and of the protest’s salience,
s, on voters’ equilibrium behaviour and the electoral outcome. We start by arguing
that efficient pure strategy equilibria –i.e. outcomes that maximize the ex-post sum of
individual utilities– always exist.
Proposition 1. There are pure strategy BNE such that M wins and the protest succeeds
with certainty, but none of them is in undominated strategies.
Indeed, consider the following strategy profile: the first t players vote for M and the
remaining vote for P independently of their type. If players adopt this profile then the
mainstream alternative, M , wins with certainty, and the protest is successful. Notice,
though that these equilibria involve dominated strategies: voting for P when you are a
“non-protester” is never better than voting for M , for any strategy profile of the rest
of the players (and for some of them it is strictly worse). It is easy to see, that all
efficient equilibria suffer from such a drawback. Hence, while there are BNE that support
a socially optimal outcome, they are not really reliable predictions.
Given that in such games the set of BNE can be really large and/or diverse, we use
dominance, symmetry and responsiveness as equilibrium selection tools. “Dominance”
means that the BNE should only involve undominated strategies. “Symmetry” requires
that all players of the same type employ the same strategy (in absence of a coordination
device, this seems quite reasonable). “Responsiveness” demands players to employ differ-
ent behaviour depending on their assigned type. Similar equilibrium selection tools are
employed in several experimental studies of electoral behaviour (e.g., Bouton et al. 2016,
2017)
Dominance essentially dictates that every player votes for M when she is a “non-
protester”. Symmetry rules out equilibria in which different players behave differently
when they are assigned the same type. Given what dominance implies, responsiveness
merely rules out the trivial equilibrium in which all players vote for M independently of













There exists a unique BNE satisfying dominance, symmetry, and reponsivness.
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When q ∈ (0, q˜(s)], this equilibrium is in pure strategies: all “non-protesters” vote for
M and all “protesters” vote for P.
When q ∈ (q˜(s), 1), this equilibrium is such that: a) all “non-protesters” vote for
M , b) each “protester” votes for P with probability p(s, q) = q˜(s)/q and for M with the
remaining probability.
The threshold value q˜(s) determines whether protesters follow a pure strategy and
always vote for P or randomize their vote. If the probability that a random voter is a
protester is below the threshold (i.e. q ≤ q˜(s)), protesters always protest. Given that q
is low, most likely there are not enough protesters to produce an electoral accident, and
hence there are incentives to always protest. On the contrary, if q > q˜(s), protesters follow
a mixed strategy where they vote P with some positive probability p(s, q). This proba-
bility is computed so that protesters are indifferent between voting for the mainstream
or protest alternative.
For low values of the protest’s popularity (i.e., q ∈ (0, q˜(s)]) the comparative statics are
obvious. In this region, both types follow pure strategies, “protesters” vote P and “non-
protesters” vote M . The probability that a random voter protests, equals the probability
an individual is a “protester” (i.e., q). The following proposition instead describes the
relevant comparative statics in the interesting region where the protest is popular enough
(i.e., q ∈ (q˜(s), 1)). These results pave the ground for our main empirical hypotheses; the
ones that we subsequently test in the laboratory.
Proposition 3 (Comparative Statics). For any q ∈ (q˜(s), 1]:
a) the probability that a protester votes for P (i.e., p(s, q)) is decreasing in q and
increasing in s,
b) the probability that a random voter votes for P (i.e., q × p(s, q)) does not vary in
q and is increasing in s.
For any value of q ∈ (q˜(s), 1) the probability that an individual protester protests
is decreasing in the protest’s popularity q. This is the main offsetting effect that the
protest’s popularity has on the individual probability that a protester actually protests.
As the protest becomes more popular, protesters protest less often to avoid an electoral
accident. The exact shape of p(s, q) for an example with two voters is depicted in Figure
2a.
Figure 2b instead illustrates that the probability that a random voter protests does
not depend on the protest’s popularity q, when q > q˜(s). The mixed strategy played by
protesters ensures exactly that: In expectation, protesters choose how often to protest
so that there is the “right” share of voters protesting. This share equals q˜(s) and does
not depend on q. That is, any change in the protest’s popularity, is accompanied by an
8













(a) Probability a “protester” votes P .













(b) Probability a random voter votes P .
Figure 2: An example where n = 2, t = 1. Solid line for s = 1, dashed line for s = 5.
Value of q˜(s) is 1/3 for s = 1 and 5/11 for s = 5.
appropriate adjustment in the individual frequency that protesters protest. In aggregate
terms, this implies that the expected vote share for P is not affected by changes in q,
suggesting that the electoral outcome is not affected by the protest’s popularity.
Changes in the protest’s salience s instead affect the probability that a randomly cho-
sen voter protests and hence the likelihood of each electoral outcome. As the protest’s
salience increases, the utility difference for a protester between a successful and an un-
successful protest increases, providing incentives to protesters to protest more often (see
Figure 2a). Given that q is fixed, an increase in s hence implies an increase in the prob-
ability that a random voter is protesting. Going back to our example with two voters,
when the salience is “low” (i.e., s = 1) the mixed strategy equilibrium dictates that the
probability a random voter is protesting is 1/3 while when the salience is “high” (i.e.,
s = 5) this probability is 5/11.
Changes in s hence surely affect the likelihood of each electoral outcome. An increase
in s —and hence an increase in the probability a random voter protests— surely increases
the frequency of electoral accidents and decreases the frequency of unsuccessful protests.
The relationship between this probability and the frequency of successful protests instead
is non-monotonic.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the probability of a random voter protest-
ing and the frequency of electoral outcomes for our example with n = 2 and t = 1. On
the left, we illustrate the monotonicity of electoral accidents and failed protests and the
non-monotonicity of successful protests. On the right, we represent the same frequencies
of electoral outcomes on the simplex. The dashed line on the simplex represents the
expected frequencies of the three outcomes assuming that a randomly chosen voter votes
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for P with any probability in the [0, 1] interval. If this probability is zero the protest
fails with certainty and we are at the northern corner of the simplex. As the protesting
probability increases we move along the dashed line till M surely loses when randomly
selected voters always protest. Both graphs also illustrate the exact frequencies of the












Protest Fails M loses
Protest Succeeds

















Figure 3: On the left, frequencies of electoral outcomes in the example where n = 2,
t = 1 assuming that a randomly selected voter protests with a given probability [0, 1].
On the right, representation of such frequencies on the simplex. For s = 1 the probability
a random voter protests is 1/3. For s = 5 this probability is 5/11. Both representations
highlight that an increase in s from 1 to 5 increases the probability of electoral accidents
and successful protests and decreases the probability of failing protests.
These findings naturally lead to a number of empirically relevant hypotheses. In
the section that follows we describe our experimental design, which aspires to test the
implications of the above theoretical analysis.
3 The Experiment
3.1 Design
The experiment took place at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the Uni-
versity of Cyprus (UCY LExEcon). A total of 128 subjects were recruited in 8 sessions,
with 16 subjects in each session.5 The experiment consisted of 100 rounds, prior to which
there were 2 practice rounds that aimed at helping the subjects familiarize with the en-
vironment. Average total payment was approximately 17.4 euros, including 5 euros as a
5Recruitment was done via ORSEE (Greiner et al. 2004).
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Treatment Salience (S) Popularity (q) Subjects Sessions Subgroups
(300, 0.5) 300 0.5 32 2 8
(300, 0.8) 300 0.8 32 2 8
(700, 0.5) 700 0.5 32 2 8
(700, 0.8) 700 0.8 32 2 8
Total: 128 8 32
Table 1: The four treatments.
participation fee, and the experiment lasted about 90 minutes.6
The experiment employs the simplest version of the protest voting game described
in the previous section. For each election, we fix the number of voters to two (n = 2),
and set the threshold for a successful protest to one (t = 1). We use a 2 × 2 factorial
design with two sessions per treatment. The two treatment variables are: (i) the protest’s
salience, S, and (ii) the protest’s popularity, q. Salience refers to the payoff (in tokens)
that protester types enjoy in the event of a successful protest, and may take one of two
values in each treatment: S ∈ {300, 700}. Popularity, q, is the probability of being and a
protester and is also selected from two possible values in each treatment: q ∈ {0.5, 0.8}.
A summary of the experimental design is shown in Table 1.
In each round, subjects were randomly matched in pairs and played a one–shot game
with their assigned pair. We use a stranger matching protocol to avoid any repeated
game effects. In order to maintain a sufficient number of independent observations, pairs
are drawn from subgroups of four subjects. Subject are told that matching is random
and that in each round it is more likely to not be matched with the same subject as in
the previous round, while the existence of these subgroups is not detailed to subjects.7
This design choice is not behaviourally neutral and we come back to that in Section 4.3.
The two subjects of each pair are asked to vote for either one of the two alternatives:
either in favor of the mainstream alternative M , or to protest and vote for P . If both
protest, the mainstream alternative M loses and both players receive 100 tokens. If both
vote for M , the mainstream alternative M wins, but the protest fails. In this case both
players receive 200 tokens. If one subject votes for M and the other for P , then the main
alternative wins and the protest succeeds. Non-protest type players receive 200 tokens,
while protesters receive S tokens. The value of S varies in different treatments. Notice
that the payoffs depend solely on the outcome and a subject’s type in the specific round,
6The experiment was designed and run on z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
7See instructions in the appendix.
11
votes: PP MP or PM MM
outcome: M loses Protest succeeds Protest fails
Protester 100 S ∈ {300, 700} 200
Non-Protester 100 200 200
Table 2: Round payoffs in tokens, for each type, depending on outcomes.
but not on the subject’s vote. Table 2 summarizes the possible outcomes and payoffs. In
the experiment we use a neutral frame without any mention of elections or voting.8
Types are assigned randomly and independently for each subject in each round. Sub-
jects know their own type but not that of their partner. They know the distribution of
types. The process is represented to them as draws (with replacement) from a single urn
with red and blue balls. In the treatments were q = 0.5 the urn contains 5 balls of each
colour. When q = 0.8 the urn contains two red balls and eight blue balls. Drawing a
blue ball means that a subject is a protester type in that round. Both subjects know the
composition of the urn. They see the ball that is drawn for them, but not the one drawn
for their partner. The composition of the urn remains the same throughout a session.
At the end of each round, subjects were informed about the choice of their partner
and their payoff from that round. Final earnings were determined by the sum of the
subject’s payoffs in 10 randomly selected rounds out of the 100.9 The conversion rate
used in the experiment was 1 euro for every 250 tokens.
3.2 Testable Hypotheses
Similar to our theoretical setting, non–protesters have a straightforward payoff-maximizing
option (i.e. vote for M). Hypothesis 0 summarizes this behaviour. Hypotheses 1 and 2
instead summarize protesters’ behaviour as predicted by Proposition 3. Recall that as
summarized in Figure 2a, for a given protest popularity, protesters protest more often as
the protest’s salience increases. Similarly, for a given salience, protesters protest less often
as the protest’s popularity increases. The exact values for the mixed strategy equilibrium
probabilities that a protester votes P in our experimental setup are given in Table 3.10
8Votes for M and P are presented as “choosing X or O”. Again, see the instructions in the appendix
for details.
9Subjects are paid based on a random subset of rounds to avoid any wealth effects. Given the large
number of rounds in the experiment, we do not pay for a single randomly picked round to keep monetary
incentives salient, as some subjects may underweight the very small likelihood of a particular round being
picked (Hertwig et al. 2004).
10Those values can be directly obtained from Proposition 2 by substituting the relevant parameters
of our experimental treatments (i.e., n = 2, t = 1, and q ∈ {0.5, 0.8}, s ∈ {1, 5}). Actually, those values
are the ones that are used in our example of Figures 2 and 3.
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Hypothesis 0. Non–protesters vote for M almost always in all treatments.
Hypothesis 1. For a given protest popularity q ∈ {0.5, 0.8}, protesters vote for P more
often in the high salience treatment (700, q) than in the low salience treatment (300, q).
Hypothesis 2. For a given salience S ∈ {300, 700}, protesters vote for P less often in
the high popularity treatment (S, 0.8) than in the low popularity treatment (S, 0.5).
Hypotheses 3 and 4 and Table 4 summarize the predictions of our model regarding
the likelihood of electoral outcomes across treatments (see Figure 3 for the corresponding
theoretical predictions). Recall that there are three possible outcomes from a pair’s vote.
If none of the two subjects votes for M , then M loses and each voter gets the lowest
possible payoff, irrespective of her being a protester or not. If only one voter votes for
M we observe a successful protest: M wins, and any voter that is a protester gets the
maximum payoff. If both voters vote for M the protest fails. M wins and both voters
get the intermediate payoff, regardless of their type.
Hypothesis 3 fixes the protest’s popularity and permits its salience to vary. One of
our main comparative statics shows that “electoral accidents” occur more often as the
protest’s salience increases. This increase in electoral accidents goes hand in hand with
an increase in the frequency of successful protests and a decrease in failing protests.
Hypothesis 3. For a given popularity q ∈ {0.5, 0.8}, M loses more often, the protest
succeeds more often, and the protest fails less often in the high salience treatment (700, q)
than in the low salience treatment (300, q).
Hypothesis 4 instead fixes the protest’s salience and varies the protest’s popularity.
As we have shown, changes in the protest’s popularity do not affect the frequency of
different electoral outcomes. This is because the mixed strategy equilibrium strategies
adjust to changes in the popularity (Hypothesis 2), letting the frequency of outcomes
invariant to changes in the protest’s popularity.
Hypothesis 4. For a given salience S ∈ {300, 700}, M loses equally often, the protest
succeeds equally often, and the protest fails equally often in the high and low popularity
treatments (S, 0.8) and (S, 0.5).
4 Results
We first present results regarding individual behaviour and then we argue how such
behaviour translates to electoral outcomes.
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4.1 Voting behaviour (Hypotheses 0-2)
Table 3 shows the Nash equilibrium predictions for each type of voter in each treatment,
as well as the corresponding mean frequency of protesting observed in the data. Figure 4
summarizes the behaviour of protesters across treatments, compares that with the Nash
predictions and summarizes relevant tests across treatments.
Focusing on the lower part of Table 3, it is reassuring to note that in line with
Hypothesis 0, non-protesters seem to realize that voting for M is payoff-maximizing
and almost always follow this strategy.
We can now focus on the behaviour of protesters. In general we find significant treat-
ment effects, as subjects respond to the changes in the treatment variables. When com-
paring behaviour to that predicted by theory we find that in three out of four treatments,
protesters vote for P less often than the Nash equilibrium prediction. The exception is
the treatment where q = 0.8 and S = 300, where the frequency observed in the data
is not statistically different from Nash. For all other treatments, we have statistically
significant under-voting for P (see Figure 4).
S = 300 S = 700
















Table 3: Equilibrium and actual frequency of protesting (i.e., voting for P ).
Regarding Hypotheses 1 and 2, although the voting frequency is mostly different
from the Nash point predictions, comparative statics move in the predicted directions.
Performing Wilcoxon rank sum tests comparing the data in two treatments aggregated
at the subgroup level (8 observations per treatment) our results indicate that treatment
effects on average protesting frequency are all statistically significant. First, for a given
popularity, protest voting among protesters is increasing in the salience (p-values<0.01).
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Figure 4: The cyan dots indicate the average frequency of protesters voting for P in
each treatment. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals for the mean, constructed
using 5000 bootstrap samples from the data clustered at the subgroup level. The red
X’s mark the Nash prediction for each treatment. The horizontal bars and stars indicate
the result of a Wilcoxon rank sum test comparing the data in two treatments aggre-
gated at the subgroup level (8 observations per treatment), with *: p-value<0.05 and
**: p-value<0.01.
Second, for a given salience, protest voting among protesters is decreasing in the popu-
larity (p-values<0.05).
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S = 300 S = 700




























Table 4: Frequencies of the three possible electoral outcomes
4.2 Voting outcomes (Hypotheses 3 & 4)
Table 4 shows the outcome distribution in the experimental treatments and the corre-
sponding Nash equilibrium distribution. Figure 5 summarizes those outcome distribu-
tions on the simplex. The arrows on Figure 5 report the p-values for a bootstrapped
Hotelling test for compositional data (Tsagris et al. 2017). All observed treatment effects
are statistically significant (highest p-value is equal to 0.0566).
The prediction of Hypothesis 3 is supported in our data. As we see in Table 4,
for a given popularity, we observe more successful protests and electoral accidents as the
protest’s salience increases, while the frequency of failing protests decreases. As we see
in Figure 5, the corresponding p-values are 0.0566 for the high popularity treatment (i.e.,
q = 0.8), and 0.0528 for the low popularity treatment (i.e., q = 0.5). The intuition is
clear: For a given q, as the protest’s salience S increases, protesters realize the potential
gain from a successful protest and protest more often (Hypothesis 1), therefore increasing
the frequency of electoral accidents and successful protests.
Support for the comparative statics regarding changes in the protest’s popularity and
Hypothesis 4 instead is less evident. Recall that for a given S, changes in q should
not affect the frequency of the three outcomes. Table 4 instead indicates that for either
level of salience, as the protest becomes more popular, the frequency of outcomes varies.
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Figure 5: Outcome frequencies for our experimental data across the four treatments and
Nash predictions on the simplex. Arrows report p-values for a bootstrapped Hotelling
test for compositional data (Tsagris et al. 2017). The dashed line and dots illustrate the
results of a simulation exercise where we assume a symmetric voting behaviour for all
protesters as detailed in Section 4.3.
As the protest becomes more popular, the protest succeeds more often, there are more
electoral accidents but also fewer failing protests. These results are also visualized in
Figure 5. For a given level of salience S, an increase in q moves the distribution point
south-east, and those movements are statistically significant (p-values are 0.0349 for the
high salience treatment (i.e., S = 700), and 0.0146 for the low salience treatment (i.e.,
S = 300)).
4.3 Asymmetric behaviour
To better understand the discrepancies between our experimental results and the theo-
retical predictions we take a closer look at the data. We first focus on the distribution of
outcomes and try to understand how far it is from the one predicted.
Figure 5 depicts expected and actual distributions of outcomes on the simplex. The
dashed line represents the expected frequencies of the three outcomes assuming symmet-
ric behaviour, where all non-protesters vote M and all protesters vote for P with any
given probability in the [0, 1] interval. If protesters never protest, the protest fails with
certainty and we are at the northern corner of the simplex. As the (symmetric) protest-
ing probability increases we move along the dashed line. The ending point of that curve
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illustrates the frequency of outcomes when protesters always protest. The illustrated
dashed line in Figure 5 is plotted for q = 0.8. While varying the level of q does not affect
the shape of the curve, it affects its ending point. That is, for lower levels of q this curve
would be “shorter”, and for higher levels of q “longer”. Finally, note that the dashed
line, passes through the equilibrium predictions of our model if protesters were following
the characterized symmetric mixed strategy.
To have a feeling of the distance between the predicted and observed distribution
of outcomes we use simulations. In each simulation a pair is drawn 100 times with
q = 0.5 (red dots) or q = 0.8 (gray dots) and the two voters vote as follows: non-
protesters always vote for M ; for protesters we fix a level for the probability of protesting
p ∈ {0, .01, .02, ..., 1} and run the simulation 100 times for each given level. For the
simulations where the protest probability is equal to the one predicted by the BNE we
colour the dots green (when q = 0.5) and blue (when q = 0.8). The coloured “clouds”
of simulated outcome distributions form pseudo-‘confidence intervals’ –CI clouds– for the
outcome distribution expected in the experiment.
A first observation is that Figure 5 visually confirms what is indicated in Table 4,
namely that observed outcomes are far from the corresponding Nash predictions. Nev-
ertheless, in the treatments in which q = 0.5 it cannot be ruled out, based on our
simulations, that subjects are using a symmetric protest strategy, as in both cases the
distribution of outcomes is “within the CI cloud” surrounding the dashed line. The same
cannot be said for the two treatments where q = 0.8. In these the outcome distributions
are too far to the right of the dashed line.
The area on the right of the dashed line represents the expected frequencies of electoral
outcomes when players adopt asymmetric strategies. That is, when each of them is
expected to protest with different probability. Notice that if player 1 adopts a strategy
that induces her protest, from an ex-ante point of view, with probability p1, while player
2 is expected to protest with probability p2, with p1 > p2, then the probability that
a random voter protests is given by (p1 + p2)/2. Importantly, when one of the two
players is observed to protest, without her identity being revealed, then, by employing
standard Bayesian updating techniques, one gets that the probability of the other player
protesting is strictly smaller than (p1 + p2)/2.
11 This suggests that when players adopt
asymmetric strategies there is a negative correlation between their protest behaviour, and
a zero correlation when the strategies are symmetric. Note, that negative correlation in
this case may arise without any (anti-)coordination device employed. Indeed, positive
correlation in protest behaviour –which corresponds to expected frequencies of outcomes
11In case p1 = p2, observing a random player protesting does not make the observer update her beliefs
about the other player protesting.
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to the left of the dashed line– would require such a coordination device, which is ruled
out by our experimental design (stranger matching and no communication).
The above suggests that the observed outcome distributions, especially in the q = 0.8
treatments, may be the result of subjects employing asymmetric strategies. In Figure
6, we plot the distribution of the frequencies of protest voting per subject conditional
on being a protester, across treatments. Differences are apparent and in line with those
suggested by Figure 5. Observe first the histograms in the low popularity treatments
(q = 0.5). The distribution is unimodal, with a great mass of protesters adopting a
homogeneous always-protesting behaviour. In the high popularity treatments (q = 0.8)
instead the distribution is bimodal. A mass of protesters is always protesting, and a
mass of protesters is never protesting; summarizing an, arguably, more heterogeneous
behaviour.
As we will next argue, these differences in the extent of “role-playing” –i.e., of behaving
in an asymmetric manner– depending on the protest’s popularity are compatible with the
predictions of the asymmetric equilibria of the game. Recall from the experimental design
that in each round subjects were randomly matched with another subject from a subgroup
of four. Formally this is described as a case where there is an electorate of size n = 4, and
k = 2 voters are randomly chosen to participate in the election. Our theoretical results
regarding symmetric equilibria still hold in this slight variation of the model.12 Still, in
this variation used in the experimental setup asymmetric equilibria may arise.
Proposition 4. Consider our experimental setup where four voters are matched randomly
in pairs, a voter is assigned a protester type with probability q, and payoffs are given in
Table 2. There exist asymmetric BNE in undominated strategies where a) voters always
vote M when non-protesters, and b) voters vote P as follows:
1. For treatments (300, 0.5) and (700, 0.5): one voter never votes P when protester,
and three voters always vote P when protesters.
2. For treatments (300, 0.5), (300, 0.8), and (700, 0.8): two voters never vote P when
protesters, and two voters always vote P when protesters.
Moreover, there exist no other asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies.
The above characterized equilibria imply that in each group of four voters, there are
either one or two voters who never protest –even when protesters–, while the remaining
voters are protesting when protesters and are voting M when non-protesters. These
findings predict a more asymmetric behaviour when the protest popularity is high than
12Indeed, Proposition 2 and the related comparative statics go through in the general case where
k ≤ n randomly drawn voters from the set of n individuals participate in the election.
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low and can backup the behaviour observed in Figure 6: the highlighted differences
between the unimodal distribution in the low popularity treatments, and the bimodal
distribution in the high popularity treatments. Protesters’ behaviour in Figure 6 for the
low popularity treatments is in line with the mildly asymmetric equilibrium in which
most players always protest when protesters. Instead, protesters’ behaviour in the high
popularity treatment is in line with the highly asymmetric equilibrium in which players
evenly split between never and always protesting when protesters.
Further support to the claim that subjects behave as if playing an asymmetric equi-
librium comes from observing how behaviour changes across rounds. Note that the asym-
metric equilibria described in Proposition 4 are in pure strategies and may arise as the
result of subjects best responding to past play, following an initial period where each sub-
ject adopts a fixed, non-equilibrium, possibly mixed strategy. Recall that subjects were
matched in subgroups of four to participate in 100 elections. Within each subgroup pairs
were formed randomly in each election. In Figure 7 there are clear signs of changes in
behaviour across rounds, with behaviour varying significantly in the first twenty rounds
(on the left) compared to the last twenty rounds (on the right). Initially protesters seem
to experiment more across protesting or not, and there are no clear differences between
the low and high salience treatments. In the last twenty rounds, the “unimodal” and
“bimodal” distributions expected in the asymmetric equilibria are clearly visible. Hence,
learning does seem to take place in our experimental setting with several players eventu-
ally settling into playing an asymmetric equilibrium instead of the mixed strategy one.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We provide experimental evidence for the main comparative statics of a simple model of
protest voting in the spirit of Myatt (2017). By distinguishing the notions of the protest’s
popularity and protest’s salience we provide new comparative statics. Experimental ev-
idence, while broadly in line with the theoretical predictions, issues additional caveats
regarding protest campaigns: fringe candidates may gain not only by fanaticising protest
voters as suggested by the formal analysis, but also by expanding their popular base. As
it was found, such strategy, improves not only the chances of a successful protest, but
also of an electoral accident where the alternative preferred by the majority of voters
loses against an inferior opponent.
As in any lab experiment, there are design choices that could be done differently.
For instance, choosing the smallest possible electorate size seems counter-intuitive when
studying behaviour in large elections. Our focus was not in replicating large elections
in the lab –a probably impossible feat–. Instead we wished to understand the degree
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Figure 6: Histograms show the distribution of individual protester voting P frequencies
by treatment. There are 32 individuals in each treatment.
(a) First twenty rounds (b) Last twenty rounds
Figure 7: Individual behaviour in early versus late rounds.
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to which it is plausible that individuals employ the strategic calculus underlying protest
voting in our theoretical model. For that to be true, subjects needed to form expectations
about others’ behaviour given what they knew about the type distribution and previous
play, and best respond to these expectations. This feature is not too different on how a
voter would decide how to vote in a large election, forming expectations about others’
votes using polls and historic results. Our results indicate that strategic protest voting
does emerge in the lab. Having established this, it is not obvious why voters participating
in large elections should reason in a significantly different way.
To be sure, our study does not settle the issue of protest voting in a definitive manner
and more research is warranted in a number of important dimensions. For instance, it is
important to understand how the described dynamics of protest and mainstream voting
adjust in multi-party environments where, typically, additional strategic considerations
co-exist. It would be particularly interesting to study the trade-off between Duvergerian
considerations (i.e., coordinate behind the mainstream alternative one dislikes less) and
protest desires (i.e., vote for a non-serious contender to mitigate the vote-share difference
between the two mainstream candidates). Moreover, one would care to understand the
effects of alternative electoral rules on protest voting decisions. Indeed, it seems that
certain electoral systems allow voters to protest more safely than others. For instance,
when voters vote according to a runoff system, they should face less risk of an electoral
accident, as they usually have the chance to correct a possible first-round accident, in the
second round.
Finally, further empirical tests in alternative settings would be useful in order to
reaffirm or qualify the present findings. Despite the fact that our experimental design
features certain positive elements, it is necessary that one explores different environments
with a larger number of alternatives and voters, richer preference structures, and also
non-artificial issues (e.g., Casella and Sanchez 2019). While analyzing such extensions is
beyond the scope of the present paper, they all certainly appear as natural and interesting
next steps.
Recent political events have highlighted the relevance of protest voting as an important
type of behaviour in elections. Since the consequences of such behaviour may go beyond
the electorate’s wishes and have significant long-term effects, it is perhaps surprising how
little it has been studied. Our paper can hopefully contribute towards closing this gap.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 By dominance, it follows that, whenever a voter is assigned a
non-protester type votes for M . By symmetry, we have that any equilibrium is essentially
characterized by a single number, p, which denotes the probability that a voter votes for
P when she is assigned a protester type. By responsiveness, it holds that this probability,
p, cannot be equal to zero.
The probability, p, is larger than zero and smaller than one only if a protester is
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and, hence, a mixed-strategy equilibrium (i.e., an equilibrium such that a protester votes
for either alternative with positive probability) exists if and only if q > q˜(s). When
q ≤ q˜(s) we have that EUM ≤ EUP for every p, and, hence, the unique equilibrium that
satisfies our properties is the pure one in which a protester votes for P with certainty.
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Proof of Proposition 4 We want to show that for any q = {0.5, 0.8} and S =
{300, 700} there are type asymmetric equilibria where: a) voters always vote M when
non-protesters, and b) k = {1, 2, 3} voters always vote M when protesters and 4 − k
voters always vote P when protesters.
It is trivial to see that voters assigned a non-protester type never have incentives to
deviate and vote P . For the voters assigned a protester type we need to show that: i)
none of the k voters has incentives to deviate and vote P , and b) none of the 4−k voters




×200 + 4− k
3




× [q×100 + (1− q)×S]




× S + 3− k
3
× [q × 100 + (1− q)× S] ≥ k
3
× 200 + 3− k
3
× [q × S + (1− q)× 200]
For q = 0.5 and S = 300 the above two inequalities are satisfied only for k = {1, 2}, for
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q = 0.5 and S = 700 only for k = {1}, for q = 0.8 and S = 300 only for k = {2}, and for
q = 0.8 and S = 700 only for k = {2}, proving the statements in the proposition.
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Sample Instructions of Treatment (300, 0.5)
Translated from the original version in Greek
Instructions
Thank you for participating in this session. Please remain quiet. The experiment will
be conducted using a computer and all answers will be recorded on this. Please do not
talk to each other and keep quiet during the session. The use of mobile phones and other
electronic devices is not permitted. Please read the instructions carefully and if you have
any questions, raise your hand and we will answer it.
General Instructions
The experiment will include a series of decisions. Each of you will receive a financial
reward. The exact amount that you will receive will depend both on your own
decisions and on the decisions of other participants, in a way that will become
clear below. In addition, you will receive 5 euros as a show-up fee. Following the com-
pletion of the experimental session, you will be paid privately in cash, by giving us the
identification number of the computer you were using.
There is no time limit for making your decision. However, it is recommended that
your choice should be submitted within a reasonable time frame, so that the experiment
can be completed on time. If asked by the researchers, please submit your choice as soon
as possible.
The Experiment
The experiment will consist of 100 rounds. Each round is completely independent of
the others. In each round, you will be randomly paired with another participant and you
will interact only with your partner. The pairs will be changing in each round, thus your
partner in a round will most likely be different from your partner in the previous round.
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The ball. At the beginning of each round the computer will randomly draw one of
the ten balls from the jar above for each member of the pair. The random draw will
be made independently for each participant and each ball will be equally probable to be
drawn. Therefore, each participant has a 50% chance of seeing a blue ball and a 50%
chance of seeing a red ball. You will only be able to see the color of your ball.
Type. The color of each participant’s ball determines the participant’s type. So, in
each round the type of a participant will be either RED or BLUE. The type of a partic-
ipant will affect his potential profits from that round in a way that will be clarified below.
The Decisions. Once you know your type for the particular round, you will have to
choose between two available options, O or X. At the same time with you, your partner
will choose between the same two options.
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Profits. Your profits in each round will depend on your type and the choices you
and your partner will make, as shown below.
Namely, if your type is Blue, then:
• If both you and your partner choose O you will get 100 points.
• If one of you chooses O and the other one chooses X you will get 300 points.
• If both you and your partner choose X you will get 200 points.
Whereas, if your type is Red, then:
• If both you and your partner choose O you will get 100 points.
• If one of you chooses O and the other chooses X you will get 200 points.
• If both you and your partner choose X you will get 200 points.
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Information at the end of each round. At the end of each round, you will be
able to see your own choice, your partner’s choice and your profit from that round.
Final profits. At the end of the experiment, 10 rounds will be selected randomly and
you will receive the sum of your profits in those rounds, plus the show-up fee (5 euros).
The conversion rate is 1 euro for every 250 points. Each one of the 100 rounds has
the same probability of being selected.
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